Introduction
There is still some disagreement about the nature of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism as applied to his theory of law and adjudication. Most commentators have ascribed to him an indirect-utilitarian prescriptive theory with regard to adjudication. Bentham sought to replace the common law system with a wholly codified body of law, issued by a utilitarian legislator. The role of the judges under such a system would be that of adjudicating by strictly applying the laws in the code. This leads to an indirectutilitarian theory in that the judges would not decide at case-level by applying directly the principle of utility, but they would rather apply general rules which, in turn, were enacted on utilitarian grounds. Utilitarian maximization, then, would be pursued only indirectly by the judges.
In his Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Gerald Postema has put
forward a different account that credits the philosopher with a direct-utilitarian theory of judicial decision.
1 According to him, Benthamic judges are required to appeal directly to the principle of utility when deciding a case. Compliance with the legislator's will, expressed in the law, should be laid aside whenever utilitarian considerations require so. Postema's 'revisionist' interpretation -which also involved a rethinking of Bentham's avowed project of codification of law in a 'complete code'
or Pannomion -has been criticized by John Dinwiddy, who has ascribed to Bentham a completely different position. According to Dinwiddy, Postema has confused
Bentham's views on legal procedure or 'adjective law' with those on substantive law.
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While the judges should be freed from unreasonable constraints in the field of procedure, they should never be allowed to dispense with substantive law, not even on utilitarian considerations. They should rather be allowed -required, indeed -to halt their decision and propose emendation of the law to the legislator, whenever they think that applying the law as it is would lead to undesirable and anti-utilitarian results.
It is worth remarking that the opposition between direct and indirect utilitarianism, which is here being made reference to, is an opposition between two different strategies of decision. In reaching for a decision, a direct-utilitarian judge will appeal directly to utilitarian evaluation and calculation, trying to maximize overall utility with his legal sentence. On the contrary, an indirect-utilitarian judge will lay aside utilitarian calculations, to decide the case according to general rules which are supposed to obtain best results in utilitarian terms. In a context of statute law, like the one which Bentham devised, this means applying the laws issued by a utilitarian legislator.
Postema vs. Dinwiddy on the role of the judge under Bentham's Pannomion
Gerald Postema has interpreted the role of Bentham's judge as that of a utilitarian who decides according to what, in his/her view, seems to maximize overall utility.
Even under a system of codified law, like Bentham's Pannomion, judges should be left free to adjudicate appealing to direct-utilitarian calculation. According to Postema's interpretation, the laws contained in the 'complete code' should not be binding on judges, at least when they seemingly dictate legal consequences which contradict utilitarian calculations. These laws would be no more than broad general principles and/or advice from the legislator to the judges. Most of all, they would provide the judge with a 'list of the relevant expectations' which are at stake in each case. Respect of law-induced expectations is of paramount importance in Bentham's legal utilitarianism: he envisaged a Disappointment-preventive or Non-disappointment principle, which 'in the genealogy of human feelings' was to be considered as 'the immediate lineal descendant of that same parent principle', that is the principle of utility. 3 Pain of disappointment was very weighty in the final balance of utility and it had to be minimized as far as possible. It damaged the security of the members of the political community, which, along with subsistence, abundance, and equality was one of the four 'subordinate ends' or 'subordinate objects' of the principle of utility -probably the most important of the four. 4 In Postema's view, however, Bentham sought to protect security of expectations without sacrificing the flexibility of the legal system at case-level. Both had to be provided for by judges, who were to be released from strict constraints by the legislator and left free to pursue utilitarian maximization.
Postema ' circumstances, without losing its character of a systematically-arranged, tidy, and easily understandable body of laws. The legal system would be preserved as a unitary and organic structure with its centre in the code; no need for strained interpretations would arise, thus avoiding the rebirth of judge-made common law.
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According to Dinwiddy, then, the Benthamic utilitarian judge should not ground his/her decisions on direct calculations of utility, but only on an application of the rules issued by the legislator. Whenever it is likely that anti-utilitarian consequences would ensue, the judge should stay execution of the law as it is and wait for the legislator to accept or refuse an amendment of his/her proposal. In no case can judges set aside the law to decide by direct application of the principle of utility and according to their own utilitarian calculations, as suggested by Postema. The sistitive and the eventually-emendative functions provide all the flexibility the system needs.
As a matter of fact, Postema acknowledges Bentham's account of these functions in the Constitutional Code, but he denies that they should be taken as the only possibility for the judges to contribute to the utilitarian flexibility of the system. He suggests that proposed alteration of the law is not requisite for questioning its strict application; in his view, Bentham leaves the judges free to choose between dispensing with the law to apply their utilitarian calculations and staying its execution to propose an amendment. 8 This interpretation, anyway, looks difficult to hold, mainly due to lack of textual evidence. Moreover, it clashes with a passage of the Constitutional Code which states that, whenever the judge disapproves on utilitarian grounds of the expected outcome of the law in a certain case, 'it is not only allowable to him, but on his responsibility, rendered incumbent on him, to stay execution accordingly '. 9 As with all other terms employed by Bentham, 'responsibility' is given by him a very precise meaning: it means subjection to punishment. No responsibility has place without the threat of an eventual punishment. 10 Also 'obligation' -which is considered by Bentham as the 'name of a fictitious entity' -is analyzed by him in terms of subjection to a probable punishment, together with its synonym 'duty'. 11 The passage above, then, means that judges should be put under an obligation or a duty to exercise the two aforementioned functions whenever it seems expedient, and that they There is a 'middle course' for the judge between applying a law that would lead to anti-utilitarian results and dispensing with it to decide according to his/her own calculations of utility.
In all ordinary cases […] between decision in precise conformity to the will of the sovereign, and decision in non-conformity and opposition to it, there is a middle course: and a course which under every government might be permitted and pursued with perfect safety. This is -to authorize the Judge when he sees occasion, after declaring that decision which to him appears to be conformable to, and called for by the declared will of the sovereign, taken as it stands at present, to suspend the execution (taking the requisite measures for the prevention of irreparable damage) till after the particular case shall have been represented to the sovereign, and his particular will signified in consequence.
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Judicial decision, then, should always be based on the law, which expresses the will of the legislator. In this respect the judge should be an indirect-utilitarian, not acting according to a direct application of the principle of utility, but in compliance with rules issued by the legislator -rules which are supposed to maximize utility.
Whenever these rules seem not to obtain best results, the function of the judge is to suggest that they be modified; in case the legislature should accept the proposed modifications, courts will have to apply the amended rule.
This account, by the way, only covers a part of the field of the judges' tasks. In justice'. The ends of justice can be 'direct' and 'collateral'. The former are 'prevention of misdecision […] and failure of justice' 17 : they regard the execution of the laws of the 'substantive branch', which express the legislator's will. The latter ends, instead, are 'prevention of delay, vexation, and expense, in so far as superfluous, or preponderant (viz. over the mischief from misdecision or from failure of justice)' 18 . The direct ends of justice can be seen as establishing an indirect relation of procedural law with the principle of utility, in the sense that they aim to maximize application of substantive (utilitarian) law, not to maximize utility. On the contrary, the collateral ends of justice must be pursued by judges in a direct-utilitarian fashion, because they ascribe to them the responsibility to calculate relevant utilities and minimize disutilities for the parties, the witnesses and all other people involved in the trial. In the 'natural system of procedure' the judge is left free to pursue the ends of justice, both direct and collateral, without procedural constraints.
The field of evidence is where Bentham most clearly ascribes to judges both freedom from procedural rules and responsibility for making utilitarian calculations.
His rejection of strict laws of evidence has led William Twining to call him an antinomian in this respect. 19 Bentham is mostly concerned with those 'exclusionary rules' that ruled out classes of evidence like hearsay and self-inculpating. The Benthamic judge should be left completely free to take into account any evidence he/she pleases.
The only limitations to this liberty should come from utilitarian considerations relating to the collateral ends of justice, namely to the purpose of minimizing unnecessary inconveniences for all concerned: 'the rule will be,-Let in the light of evidence. The exception will be,-Except where the letting in of such light is attended with preponderant collateral inconvenience, in the shape of vexation, expense, and delay '20 . Cases may arise in which the benefit expected for the 'direct ends of justice'
is clearly overbalanced by the collateral damages that examination of a certain piece of evidence would provoke.
By laying a barrow-full of rubbish on a spot on which it ought not to have been laid (the side of a turnpike road,) Titius has incurred a penalty The end of maximizing execution of the substantive laws is not to be taken as always prevailing over that of minimizing delay, vexation and expense:
The quantity of vexation, expense, and delay, without which the course necessary to the execution of the article of substantive law in question cannot be pursued with effect,-the price thus necessary to be paid for the chance of obtaining the benefit in question,-does it exceed the value of that benefit, or rather of that chance? In such case the price ought not to be paid: the law ought rather to remain unexecuted.
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The last two passages quoted above have been taken by Postema as proof of the fact that, in Bentham's view, the absence of strict rules is not to be confined to procedural matters, but it is part of his model of how substantive laws should be not say that substantive laws should be dispensed with when they seem to attain suboptimal results, nor that judicial calculations of utility should be substituted to the application of the laws. He rather appeals to the common sense of the judges as regards examination of evidence. Wherever such examination would entail collateral damages superior to the expected benefit of applying the law, the judges should give in and do without the piece of evidence in question. There is little doubt this involves autonomous utilitarian calculation on the part of the judges; but this amounts by no means to setting aside the law and substituting direct application of the principle of utility to applying the will of the legislator. The judges are required to take into account the costs and benefits of examining any piece of evidence. Should they choose not to admit it on account of excessive costs -in terms of delay, vexation, and expense -they consciously run the risk not to be able to form a correct judgment.
There is a chance, as Bentham says, that the excluded piece of evidence would have contributed to the direct ends of justice, that is, avoiding misdecision and failure of justice. This chance must be included into a balance that, on the other side, also takes into account probable drawbacks in terms of delay, vexation, and expense, mostly for parties and witnesses. These are complex direct-utilitarian calculations that are required of the judges, but they do not involve the possibility of discarding laws enacted by the legislature on account of their anti-utilitarian consequences. This is rather a solution to a conflict between the two different ends of adjective law. In Postema's interpretation Benthamic judges seem to be trusted with the power to act on the level of substantial law by substituting their own will to that of the legislator.
Bentham's position, instead, seems rather to be that the judges should be left free to appeal to direct-utilitarian calculations in order to settle a conflict between the two ends of adjective law. The legislature itself should require them to do so. 25 Conflicts of this kind belong to judicial procedure and they can be seen as affecting the relations between this and substantive law. They are quite different from those conflicts issuing from cases in which application of a law on the one side, and direct judicial application of the principle of utility on the other, would result in two different judicial decisions. This latter kind of conflict wholly belongs to the field of substantive law, at least in Bentham's view.
Moreover, freedom for the judges not to take into account any evidence, the examination of which would tilt the balance of utility on the wrong side, does not mean complete freedom from constraints from the legislator, nor disregard for the application of substantive law.
Direct utilitarian calculation on the part of the judges must take into account the risk of the non-application of laws. In deciding whether to refuse a piece of evidence in order to avoid excessive delay, vexation, and expense, the judge has to take into account both the 'amount of mischief' produced by misdecision or by failure of justice in the particular case and the danger of misdecision or failure of justice. The former 'depends upon the nature and importance of the cause'. In criminal cases, both the seriousness of the offence and the quantity of the punishment must be taken into account. In non-criminal cases the expected benefit and mischief at stake for the parties are to be weighed. 26 As for the latter, that is the danger of misdecision or failure of justice, this is clearly a case of probability to be assessed by the judge, who has to evaluate how much excluding the evidence in question would increase the risk of a wrong decision. 27 Now, we can reasonably ascribe to Bentham the view that in many cases -mainly criminal ones -the sheer quantity of the damage, which a wrong decision would provoke, would be enough to prompt the judge to admit any available evidence, without much regard for collateral damages like delay, vexation, and expense, which would be outweighed in the final balance of utility.
The reason why Bentham leaves room for such direct-utilitarian calculations on the part of the judges is that this is a necessary part of the global utilitarian strategy of the legislator. In his view, it is impossible to lay down general rules for deciding in each case whether to admit or not a certain piece of evidence. Due to the infinite variety of circumstances, which influence the final outcome of the utilitarian calculation, this is something that should be left for the judge to assess. This is the reason why the legislative authority ought 'to leave, or rather to place, in the hands of one of its objects, or say ends in view, the maintenance of the constitutional subordination of the judicial authority to that of the legislature. iv. In outside show, by this arrangement, addition is made to the power of the Judge; in design it is, and in effect it will be seen to be-the applying a limitation to it: and that a highly needful one.
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In Bentham's view, as long as judicial subjection to the legislative authority is guaranteed, there is no judge-made law. 'Judiciary-bred' acts and amendments acquire the force of law whenever they follow fixed proceedings, which allow the legislator to repeal or to adopt them (explicitly or tacitly).
Postema's overall interpretation of the Benthamic system of adjudication as a […] for the dispatch of suits, in which it is your misfortune to be embarked, -no regard need to be paid, or ought to be paid, to any rules, on which, in the Courts in which you are respectively undergoing plunderage, the proceedings have been grounded. For, […] no decision can be more decidedly in contradiction to any one of those rules, than, in instances in vast abundance, those same rules are to one another; and
[…] accordingly a much better chance for the prevention of disappointment will be obtained, by aiming at that object immediately, than by aiming at it through so unconducive, and in every respect unapt a medium, as that which is composed of those same rules. Equity Courts. These rules were contradictory and unsatisfactory; they were unable to secure non-disappointment of expectations. Leaving the judge free to weigh and balance the expectation utilities at stake, then, was preferable to tying his/her hands with pointless rules. In Dinwiddy's opinion, anyway, the quoted passage provides no evidence of a general opposition to fixed rules in Bentham's theory of adjudication.
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Dinwiddy seems to be right in interpreting the passage as concerning specifically those rules of procedure which were followed in English Equity Courts.
Postema, by the way, only quotes the last part ('a much better chance for the prevention of disappointment will be obtained, by aiming at that object immediately, than by aiming at it through so unconducive, and in every respect unapt a medium, as that which is composed of those same rules'). He misses the specific reference to those rules which slowed down and complicated Equity suits, not unlike common law Nonetheless, some expectations do arise and the Dispatch Court judge must respect and safeguard them. This is why he/she has to appeal directly to the non- disappointment principle (which is in fact a deputy of the principle of utility). As no reliable and stable rules are available for judicial decision to be grounded upon, the judge will be left free to weigh and balance the parties' expectations. power is available to judges even when the law within which they work 44 Postema, Common Law Tradition, p. 430. is an ideal, comprehensive, utilitarian code. But this suggests that either the judge is free to ignore the code at will, or that the code is composed of little more than broad general principles which must be applied in particular cases only with the help of the principle of utility. 45 Postema's 'revisionist' interpretation has the merit of leaving behind the received view of Bentham's judge as the Montesquieuan bouche de la loi, whose application of the law could be seen as a wholly mechanical, non-discretionary process. Bentham's prescriptive theory of judicial interpretation is much more sophisticated than this and allows both for a 'strict' and for a 'liberal' interpretation on the part of the judges. While the former is meant to apply the actual will of the legislator as expressed by the text of the law, the latter goes beyond the text to apply the hypothetical will of the legislator, whenever it looks clear that the letter of the law expresses inadequately what the legislator meant. This is in effect an alteration of the law by the judges, although in a weak sense. 46 Moreover, Bentham distinguishes between a 'power of imperation de classibus' and a 'power of imperation de singulis'.
The first is the power to issue general commands regarding classes of acts and of people, and it belongs to the legislator. The second is the power to issue particular orders concerning individual cases, and it belongs to the judge. The power of imperation de classibus 'even though it be supreme, can never of itself be absolute and unlimited '. 47 This is so because laws produced by the legislature need to be written in general terms ('generic names'), which establish classes of people, of acts etc.; anyone who, like the judges, has the power to decide whether a certain person or thing or act belongs to the general class, holds thereby a power which limits that of the legislature. languages, makes it impossible to wholly predetermine application of the rule to any particular case, thus leaving a margin of discretion to the interpreter; 49 in this view, then, adjudication processes can never be entirely mechanical or deductive.
However, Postema's interpretation of the general characteristics of the Pannomion does not find sufficient support in Bentham's writings. Having assumed that Bentham's theory of adjudication is an entirely direct-utilitarian one, Postema puts forward, with regard to the Pannomion, a choice between two alternatives: either 1) the laws contained in the complete code can be set aside by the judge whenever he/she thinks it necessary, or 2) the code does not contain mandatory laws, but rather broad principles for the judge to apply discretionally at case-level, with the help of direct utility calculations.
The first of the proposed alternatives seems to suggest that the laws contained in the code should not be seen as mandatory rules, but rather as advice from the legislator to the judges. This clearly conflicts with all those passages in which
Bentham explains that laws can be seen as commands issued by the legislature, with the exception of those expressing a countermand. There are only three reasons why the word 'command' cannot be used as a perfect synonym of 'law':
1. It gives no intimation that the will in question is in any manner referable to sovereign. 2. It does not include a countermand, and 3. It is not applicable without some degree of harshness to any material instrument, such as a written or printed paper whereby the will in question is expressed. When applied to anything written, it seems to denote the will which is expressed, in exclusion of the writing by which it is expressed.
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Bentham here does not even hint at the fact that a law could also constitute a simple piece of advice, with no imperative character. Sometimes he uses 'law' and 'command' as synonyms. 51 The reason is that laws have as their central and indispensable part an 'imperative provision': the imperative provision is the basic unit which could even constitute a complete law by itself. 52 The laws contained in the Pannomion, then, cannot be seen as so many pieces of advice to the judge. and rules of thumb. But (the great majority of) the laws to be contained in the complete code are mandatory and cannot be set aside by the judges, as if they were so many pieces of advice.
The second alternative proposed by Postema is that the Pannomion would not contain precise rules, but rather broad principles that would leave great liberty to the judges. These principles would be simple guidelines for adjudication. The judges would have great freedom in interpreting and applying them at case-level, with the help of direct appeal to the principle of utility. Postema here seems to conceive of principles as very broad rules, with a very low degree of specificity. Principles, then, should guide action in the sense that they inspire it, not that they command it.
Moreover, as we have already seen, Postema suggests that the intrinsic indefiniteness of these rules would mean that the code should contain a relatively small number of Every man has his determinate measure of understanding: the more complex the law, the greater the number of those who cannot understand it. Hence it will be less known; it will have less hold upon men; it will not occur to their minds on the occasions on which it ought, or, what is still worse, it will deceive them, and give birth to false expectations.
Both style and arrangement ought to be simple. The law should be a manual of instruction for every individual, and he ought to be able to consult it, under all doubts, without requiring an interpreter. So as each individual have but the advantage and comfort of beholding effectually within his reach -within the reach of his purse, as well as of the mastery of his mind, whatsoever parts he is in any way concerned in point of interest to be acquainted with, the bulk of the whole, how vast soever, is with reference to him a matter of indifference: overbulkiness is not with relation to him among the properties that belong to it.
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The Scotch Reform manuscripts contain a passage which could be seen as supporting Postema's interpretation:
Taken by itself, every law [...] is prima facie an evil: its very existence is prima facie evidence of its mischievousness. Even supposing no fresh load of obligation imposed by it, still the new law is prima facie an evil: for if not on the will, it is at any rate an additional load on the understanding: it adds to the difficulty of comprehending and thence of being governed by, the rule of action taken in its whole extent: it adds to the uncognoscibility, to the relative uncertainty, of the whole body of the laws.
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Bentham, then, is against the hypertrophy of law and in favour of reduction to a minimum of the number of rules in the code. But what does this minimum amount to?
Should the code contain hundreds or hundreds of thousands of laws? Once again, here we have no textual evidence that the Pannomion should contain a relatively small number of broad principles instead of a larger number of precise laws. It could very well be that the smallest necessary number of rules is indeed a very large one.
Lastly, not only does Postema hold that the rules in the code should be broad and generic and that they should be relatively few, but he adds that they should be applied by the Benthamic judge 'with the help of the principle of utility'. 64 How should this be interpreted? If this means that substantive law should be applied with procedures which include direct-utilitarian calculations, then Postema is right, as we have already seen. But if Postema relates this to the two other alleged characteristics of the code -namely, that its rules should be few and very generic -meaning that even under the Pannomion judges should decide substantive matters applying directly the principle of utility, then he has no sufficient textual support for his view, as we have already seen.
Conclusion
Postema's view of Bentham's theory of adjudication as a direct-utilitarian one needs to be amended in several respects. It is true that Bentham advocates freedom for the judges to pursue directly the maximization of utility in procedural matters, but this does not bear reference to application of substantive law and does not make them free to dispense with it. In Bentham's view, judges do have to make direct-utilitarian calculations, but these are mainly confined to the field of 'adjective law' and, most of all, to admission of evidence. Whenever they reckon that the substantive law as it is would obtain anti-utilitarian results, they are under the obligation of staying its execution and of referring this to the legislature. This latter shall decide whether to amend the law in accordance with the judge's suggestion. If this happens, the judge will apply the modified law to the case which called for the amendment. This is how the legal system will receive its necessary flexibility. In Bentham's view, judges should by no means be allowed to set aside the law and decide applying directly the principle of utility.
The Equity Dispatch Court writings offer a model of Benthamic adjudication under a system of non-codified law. Postema is right in pointing out that Bentham's utilitarian judge must be conferred considerable powers in deciding according to direct-utilitarian calculations; but, once again, these powers only concern the field of procedure, not that of substantive law. It is true that in the Equity Dispatch Court writings Bentham suggests the judges should adjudicate pursuing directly the minimization of the disappointment of the parties. It is also true that this in fact amounts to deciding by applying the principle of utility, which in this case takes the form of the 'non-disappointment principle'. But prevention of disappointment and security of expectations require different tasks of the judges under a common law system than under a completely codified body of laws. Under Bentham's ideal Pannomion, the citizens' expectations would focus on the code and the nondisappointment principle would prescribe the application of the rules contained in it.
While the Equity Dispatch Court offers a model of ideal utilitarian procedures, it is
